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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The main thrust of Justice Wahl's dissent is that the policy considera-
tions, which led to the formulation of the Robtason standard requiring
clear and compelling evidence that the substantial welfare of the child
necessitates the name change, should not be applicable when a parent
seeks to change the child's surname so that no natural parent's name
would be eliminated but rather both names would form the child's sur-
name.3 7 Thus, Justice Wahl contended that the Robinson standard im-
poses an undue burden on the petitioner when the proposed name
change adds a natural parent's name rather than eliminates a natural
parent's name.3
8
The Saxton decision is important for its elucidation of the factors which
a trial court may consider in granting or denying a minor's name
change. 39 The ultimate test for the name change of a minor is still the
best interests of the child.40 Nonetheless, where all of the policy interests
may be harmonized, for example by allowing a change of the minor's
name to a hyphenated combination of both natural parents' surnames,
the burden of proof should be easier for the petitioning parent. The ma-
jority of the court, however, still maintains that a child's name will not
be changed over the objection of a natural parent unless clear and com-
pelling evidence that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates the
change. 4 1
Franchise Law-THIRD-PARTY ASSIGNEE OF FRANCHISOR SUBJECT TO
ALL DEFENSES AVAILABLE TO FRANCHISEE-Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Clusiau Sales &Rental, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1981).
Franchising is a twentieth century phenomenon.' Except for some re-
cently enacted state statutes,2 there is little common law or statutory law
37. 309 N.W.2d at 302.
38. See id. Justice Wahl continues:
In this situation, instead of being required to show that the name change is nec-
essary for the substantial welfare of the child, the petitioner should be required
to show only that the name change promotes the child's best interests. Thus, a
change of the minor's surname would be appropriate where the change is benefi-
cial for the child, even though the given name is not detrimental to the child's
well-being.
Id at 302-03.
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
41. 309 N.W.2d at 301.
1. See generally C. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISE (1970) (discussion of his-
tory of franchise law). The years from 1910 to 1940 witnessed the growth of franchise
systems, especially in the automobile industry and soft drink bottling industry. Id at 37.
2. See MINN. STAT. §§ 80C.01-.22 (1982);see also ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-807 to -826
(1979); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1971 & Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-133 to -133n (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2551-53 (Supp.
1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.416 (West Supp. 1975); HAWAn REV. STAT. §§ 482E-1 to
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dealing with the special problems of the franchise relationship. 3 In Chase
Manhattan Bank v. Clusiau Sales & Rental, Inc., 4 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that an exclusive dealership agreement was a franchise within
the meaning of the Minnesota Franchise Act, 5 and that the overtures
made to defendant's president were an offer of an unregistered franchise
entitling6 the defendant to remedies provided by the Act. 7 The court
also held that a lease executed contemporaneously with the franchise was
part of the franchise agreement 8 and refused to enforce a clause in the
lease waiving any defenses against an assignee that the franchisee might
have against the franchisor.9
Defendant, Clusiau Sales & Rental, Inc., executed an exclusive dealer-
ship agreement with Scotti Muffler Company to operate a Scotti Muffler
center for the sale and installation of mufflers and pipes.l 0 The agree-
ment was a franchise as defined by the Minnesota Franchise Act.Il It
was undisputed that Scotti did not comply with the registration require-
-12 (1974 & Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 701-40 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:10-1 to -15 (West Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-19-
01 to -17 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 650.005-.170 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 19-28-1 to -15 (Supp. 1981); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37-5A-1 to -87 (1974 & Supp.
1981); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-557 to -574 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.100.010 to -.940 (1971 & Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 553.01-.78 (West 1974 &
Supp. 1981).
3. Note, Regulation of Franchising, 59 MINN. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (1975).
4. 308 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1981).
5. Id. at 492.
6. Id. at 493. The statute states that "[n]o person may offer or sell any franchise in
this state unless there is an effective registration statement on file in accordance with the
provisions of sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 or unless the franchise or transaction is exempted
under section 80C.03." MINN. STAT. § 80C.02 (1982); see also Martin Investors, Inc. v.
Vander Bie, 269 N.W.2d 868, 875 (Minn. 1978) (construing "offer").
7. "A person who violates any provisions of sections 80C.01 to 80C. 13 and 80C.15 to
80C.22 or any rule thereunder shall be liable to the franchisee or sub-franchisor who may
sue for damages caused thereby, for rescission, or other relief as the court may deem ap-
propriate." See MINN. STAT. § 80C.17, subd. 1 (1982).
8. 308 N.W.2d at 493.
9. Id at 494.
10. Id at 492. The agreement granted Clusiau the right to operate a Scotti Muffler
Center, employing the "Scotti System" and utilizing trade secrets, special signs, equip-
ment, advertising, and other business procedures. See id.
11. MINN. STAT. § 80C.01, subd. 4 (1982). A franchise is defined by MINN. STAT.
§ 80C.01, subd. 4 (1982) which provides in part:
"Franchise" means a contract or agreement, either express or implied, whether
oral or written, for a definite or indefinite period, between two or more persons:
(1) by which a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of
offering or distributing goods or services using the franchisor's trade name, trade-
mark, service mark, logotype, advertising, or other commercial symbol or related
characteristics;
(2) in which the franchisor and franchisee have a community of interest in
the marketing of goods or services at wholesale, retail, by lease, agreement, or
otherwise; and
(3) for which the franchisee pays, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee.
1983)
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ments of Minnesota Statute sections 80C.04-.05,12 but plaintiff, Chase
Manhattan Bank, contended that Clusiau failed to prove that Scotti had
offered or sold a franchise in Minnesota.
13
The court noted that an offer in the strictest sense of contract law need
not be shown under the Minnesota Franchise Act. 14 Under the Act, offer
is defined as "every attempt to offer to dispose of, and every solicitation
of an offer to buy a franchise or interest in a franchise for value."15 Thus
Scotti's telephone call from its Miami office to Minnesota asking defend-
ant to consider becoming a Scotti dealer was an offer.
16
Clusiau signed a lease contemporaneously with the franchise agree-
ment 17 for rental of pipebending equipment.18 The lease contained a
provision waiving all claims or defenses against any assignee of the
leasor. 19 Subsequently, Scotti assigned the lease to Chase Manhattan
Bank, which brought suit to recover amounts due under the lease.20 The
bank argued that its position was similar to a holder in due course be-
cause of the waiver provision, and Clusiau could only assert those de-
fenses available against a holder in due course.2 1 The trial court
The Clusiau court held that the dealership agreement "clearly [met] the criteria specified
in the statute." 308 N.W.2d at 492.
12. 308 N.W.2d at 493. Most states which have enacted franchise legislation have a
registration requirement compelling disclosure of information to protect prospective
franchises. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31110 (West Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 482E-
3 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MINN.
STAT. § 80C.02 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-03 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 650-010 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-28-5 (Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-
5A-16 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-560 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.100.140 (Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 553.21 (West Supp. 1981). Violations of
disclosure provisions give a franchisee a cause of action for damages in California, Hawaii,
Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wis-
consin. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31300 (West Supp. 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 482E-9
(Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 721(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MINN.
STAT. § 80C.17 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-12 (Supp. 1981); R.I. COMP. LAWS
§ 19-28-9 (Supp. 1981); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-85 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.100.210 (Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 553.26 (West Supp. 1981).
13. 308 N.W.2d at 493; see MINN. STAT. § 80C. 19, subd. 2 (1982). The franchise
must be offered or sold in Minnesota for the protections of the act to be available. For the
purposes of §§ 80C.01 to 80C.22 "an offer to sell . . . is made in this state . . . when the
offer originates from this state or is directed by the offeror to this state and received by the
offeree in this state." MINN. STAT. § 80C.19, subd. 2 (1982) (emphasis added).
14. See 308 N.W.2d at 493. The court had previously rejected a strict contractual
reading of the statute in an earlier case. See Martin Investors, Inc. v. Vander Bie, 269
N.W.2d at 873-74.
15. MINN. STAT. § 80C.01, subd. 16 (1982).
16. 308 N.W.2d at 493.
17. Id at 493; see infra note 28.
18. Id. at 490.
19. Id. at 493.
20. Id at 490.
21. Id at 494. The defenses a party may assert against a holder in due course are
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determined that Clusiau was entitled to rescind the lease because Scotti
violated the registration requirements of the Minnesota Franchise Act.
Chase Manhattan Bank appealed.
22
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that
to allow the bank to enforce the waiver of defenses clause would circum-
vent the registration requirement in the Franchise Act and would ad-
versely affect the remedial reach of the statute.
23
The bank's contentions that it had commercially recognized rights as a
holder in due course and that waiver of defense provisions are commer-
cially recognized under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) are not
without merit in the proper context. 24 But within the context of
franchising, public policy protects franchisees who, typically, have less
commercial sophistication and bargaining power.25 Although the bank
relied heavily upon the UCC to define its interests as a holder in due
course and to support the general respectability of waivers of defenses,
the court based its decision on the policies underlying the franchise
statute. 2
6
limited to infancy, other incapacity, duress, or illegality of the transaction. See MINN.
STAT. § 336.3-305, subd. 2(b) (1982).
22. 308 N.W.2d at 490-91.
23. Id. at 494.
24. See Holt v. First Nat'l Bank, 297 Minn. 457, 460-61, 214 N.W.2d 698, 700 (1973).
With respect to UCC public policy, where two equally innocent parties are involved and
the party bearing a loss is aware of a well-known risk, harsh applications of the UCC need
not be mitigated, although harsh results are not favored.
25. See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING REALITIES AND REMEDIES 34 (2d ed. 1978); Note,
supra note 3, at 1035-36. Typically, a franchisor will take on a franchisee with absolutely
no prior experience in exchange for the franchisee's agreement to run the franchise "by the
book." If the franchisee fails to run his shop according to every letter detail, he may be
subject to at least a partial forfeiture of his investment, regardless if going by the book
makes no business sense and causes the franchisee to lose his own money.
26. Other jurisdictions have enforced waiver of defense clauses protecting the as-
signee. The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded in J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Skjoldal,
296 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1980), that "[clourts have generally held waiver of defense clauses
enforceable in commercial transactions involving sale of equipment when there is no
showing of financer involvement in the sale sufficient to constitute lack of good faith or
establish that the financer had notice of a claim or defense." Id. at 517. The Wisconsin
case which the plaintiff in Clusiau relied on to enforce the waiver of defense clause is distin-
guishable from the Minnesota court's decision because the Wisconsin court found no evi-
dence of a dealership agreement similar to the one determined in the Minnesota case. See
Chase Manhattan Bank v. Foster Pontiac, Inc., 94 Wis. 2d 694, 289 N.W.2d 372 (1976).
In National Bank of North America v. Deluxe Poster Co., 51 A.D.2d 582, 378 N.Y.S.2d
462 (1976), the New York Supreme Court relied on the UCC's enforcement of waiver of
defense clauses in § 9-206 and appeared to grant the assignee of a lease the status of a
holder in due course. In ITT Indus. Credit v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 229
S.E.2d 814 (1976), the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not grant the assignee of a
retail installment contract the status of holder in due course, but nevertheless held the
assignee free of all defenses because he took the assignment for value, in good faith, and
without notice of claims or defenses. See also Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman, 129
Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686 (1973).
19831
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After establishing that the dealership agreement was a franchise agree-
ment,2 7 and that the lease, executed contemporaneously with the dealer-
ship agreement, was part of that agreement, 28 the court held that the
assignee of the franchisor, Chase Manhattan Bank, was in no better posi-
tion than the franchisor, Scotti.29 A franchisee, stated the court, is af-
forded by the Act the right to have the entire agreement declared void ab
zhtn'o if the agreement was issued in violation of the Act's registration
requirements.30 Thus, because a franchisor who has violated the statute
cannot avoid the franchisee's right of rescission,31 neither can the as-
signee avoid that right. 32 The court reasoned that to allow an assignee to
assert the waiver of defense clause and thus avoid the remedies provided
for in the statute is "contrary to public policy."33 A contrary decision
would unreasonably narrow the remedial reach of the franchise statute.34
There is a disqualification provision within the franchise statute bar-
ring attempts by a franchisor to evade requirements set out by the Act. 35
If Scotti had attempted to evade the statute directly by resorting to pro-
visions making the statute inapplicable to its Clusiau dealership, the stat-
ute itself would thwart such a maneuver. The disqualification provision
supports the holding in Clusiau in that the franchisor used the lease as-
27. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
28. 308 N.W.2d at 493. "The parties' obligation to enter the lease was set forth in the
dealership agreement." Id; see Koch v. Han-Shire Invs., Inc., 273 Minn. 155, 165, 140
N.W.2d 55, 62 (1966). The Koch court stated "that where instruments relating to the same
transaction are executed at the same time and for the same purpose, they will be read
together and each will be construed with relation to the other unless the parties stipulate
otherwise." Id. at 161, 140 N.W.2d at 62; see also, First & Lumbermen's Nat'l Bank of
Chippewa Falls v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 102-03, 18 N.W.2d 771, 774 (1945).
29. See 308 N.W.2d at 494.
30. Id.
31. See MINN. STAT. § 80C.17, subd. 1 (1982);cf Peck of Chehalis, Inc. v. C.K. of W.
Am., Inc., 304 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1981). Three months prior to the Cluszau decision the
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that failure to register a franchise offer in violation
of franchise law (N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-19-03 (Supp. 1981)) did not automatically enti-
tle the franchisee to rescission of the agreement. North Dakota's franchise legislation is
substantially the same as Minnesota's. Both give broad equitable powers to the court to
grant rescission or other relief which the court may deem appropriate. Compare N.D.
CENT. CODE § 51-19-12 (Supp. 1981) with MINN. STAT. § 80C.17 (1982). In Peck, how-
ever, the North Dakota court determined that simply because rescission appears in a stat-
ute as a remedy available to the franchisee, more than a mere showing of a violation of the
franchise law is necessary to consider the agreement unlawful at its inception. 304 N.W.2d
at 98. The Peck court concluded that, at a minimum, the franchisee must overcome equi-
table defenses of the franchisor to be entitled to the rescission remedy. Id. at 101.
32. See 308 N.W.2d at 493-94.
33. Id at 494.
34. Id
35. See MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (1982). The statute reads: "Any condition, stipulation
or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance
with any provision of sections 80C.01 to 80C.22 or any rule or order thereunder is void."
Id
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signment and waiver of defenses to indirectly skirt local liability. The
provision against evasion of the statute thus justifies the court's nonrecog-
nition of the franchise assignment and waiver of defenses.3
6
Chase Manhattan Bank also suggested that it could be a qualified
holder in due course 37 as an assignee whose interest in the lease would
not be nullified by a collapse of the primary agreement between the orig-
inal parties. 38 But the court disposed of this prospect on the ground that
the effect of the remedy of rescission is to extinguish a rescinded contract
so effectively that in contemplation of law it never existed.39 Here,
Scotti's power to assign the lease itself would have been a nullity, giving
the bank no rights against Clusiau. The court could find an exception to
the effects of franchise rescission only if there were no evidence of a deal-
ership subject to Minnesota's franchise statutes. 40
The court's holding in Clusiau breaks new ground in interpreting the
scope of the Minnesota Franchise Act, but is essentially consistent with
prior holdings in which courts have protected franchisees from abuses by
the franchise industry.4' Tension created by the case, if any, comes from
its possible impact upon unsuspecting third parties. Nothing in the case,
however, indicates that third parties would not also have a cause of ac-
tion, like a franchisee, against a franchisor acting in violation of the
statute.4
2
36. See also 308 N.W.2d at 494. The court also noted that the Commissioner of Secur-
ities and Real Estate had recently promulgated a regulation proscribing the use of waiver
of defense clauses. Id. at 494 n.2.
37. 308 N.W.2d at 494; see MINN. STAT. § 336.3-305 (1982). Section 336.3-305 sets
out the rights of a holder in due course. To be a holder in due course, the person or entity
must be: (1) a holder (2) of a negotiable instrument who took it (3) for value (4) in good
faith (5) without notice of any defense. See MINN. STAT. § 336.3-302 (1982). See generally
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 14-2 (2d ed. 1980).
38. Several other jurisdictions have allowed a qualified holder in due course status.
See cases cited supra note 26.
39. See Koch v. Han-Shire Invs., Inc., 273 Minn. 155, 167, 140 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1966).
40. See 308 N.W.2d at 494 (citing Chase Manhattan Bank v. Foster Pontiac, Inc., 94
Wis. 2d 694, 289 N.W.2d 372 (1979)). In Foster Pontiac, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that the waiver of defense clause in a similar lease between the same franchisor and the
bank was valid. The case was distinguished in that there was no evidence of a dealership
agreement subject to Wisconsin's franchise statute. See 308 N.W.2d at 494.
41. See, e.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 463 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (E.D. Va. 1979).
Failure to comply with provisions of state rcgulation makes a franchisor subject to statu-
tory remedies, notwithstanding remedies that may have been available outside the statute.
See also Martin Investors, Inc. v. Vander Bie, 269 N.W.2d 868, 869 & 876 (Minn. 1978).
Typically, rescission and equitable relief have been applied through Minnesota's
Franchise Act, but penalties and civil damages are acceptable alternatives. See MINN.
STAT. §§ 80C.16 & 80C.17, subd. 1 (1982). The applied goals of the Act have been deter-
rence and restoration of an abused franchisee to a position similar to that which he occu-
pied before any franchise agreement was entered.
42. See MINN. STAT. §§ 80C.17, subd. 1, 80C. 18, 80C.19 (1982). The scope of the
remedies provided by the Act is broadly defined, and expandable via regulations.
19831
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By focusing upon remedies and public policy to construe the Minne-
sota Franchise Act and apply it to the facts of Clust'au, the court has pro-
vided adequate relief without unduly controlling commercial law. It has
refined the public policy scope of the Minnesota Franchise Act without
limiting it to a tortured construction of the UCC.43 As long as the deal-
ership agreement between the contracting parties can be shown to fit
within the definitional parameters of a franchise,44 the policy behind the
Minnesota Franchise Act covers every part of the agreement and those
responsibilities and duties integral or ancillary to it.4 5
Notwithstanding other decisions to the contrary,46 the holding in Clu-
s'au4 7 reflects the trend of limiting assignee rights,48 and increasing judi-
cial skepticism of the validity of waiver of defense clauses.49 The decision
is also in accord with the basic legislative intent to protect the franchisee
in situations of unequal bargaining power. 50
Hearsay Evidence-ADMISSIBILITY AT CRIMINAL TRIALS OF EX PARTE
STATEMENTS WHERE DECLARANT IS UNAVAILABLE-Iate v. Hansen, 312
N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1980).
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in court.2 To be admissi-
ble at trial, testimony usually must meet three requirements: the declar-
ant must be under oath, 3 the declarant must be present at trial,4 and the
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The UCC supplements local rules with-
out necessarily replacing them. Chase Manhattan did not qualify itself as a holder in due
course by a formal application of the definitional criteria.
44. See MINN. STAT. § 80C.01, subd. 4 (1982).
45. See generally H. BROWN, supra note 25, at 32-51.
46. See cases cited supra note 26.
47. 308 N.W.2d at 490.
48. Comment, Sales: Minnesota Statute Regulates Consumer Notes and Limits Rights of As-
signee-Minn. Stat. § 325.940-.941 (/971), 56 MINN. L. REv. 510 (1972).
49. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Assignments-Condtional Sales Contracts-
Waiver of Defense Clauses, 58 Ky. L.J. 850, 856-57 (1970). For a contrary argument, see
Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217, 231-33
(1964).
50. Note, supra note 3.
1. Hearsay is defined in MINN. R. EvID. 801(c) as "[a] statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978).
2. For an indepth analysis of the hearsay rule, see 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
3. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245, at 582.
The oath may be important in two aspects. As a ceremonial and religious sym-
bol it may induce in the witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth,
and also it may impress upon the witness the danger of criminal punishment for
perjury, to which the judicial oath or equivalent solemn affirmation would be a
prerequisite condition.
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